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Abstract 
Disputations on the transtemporal identity have been a perennial predicament of philosophy. Despite the many array 
of theories, the persistence of identity through time presents hackneyed and relentless arguments which seeks to 
suffice our appropriation of identity. Identity is absolute if taken in the strictest sense and in sheer idem-identity. But 
identity, especially of ipse-identity, does not just constitute of absolute sameness alone but also of the recognition of 
self and the inevitable inclusion of temporality. In the gamut of works of Charles Hartshorne held in scrutiny, 
process philosophy has offered a neoclassical paradigm in approaching this interminable transtemporal knot of 
identity, i.e., a partial (personal) identity through the novel injunction of the concept of inheritance. This study aims 
to present a tenable option for identity that serves as a plausible alternative to the problem of persistence through 
temporal passage and of continuity of character without resorting to “substance-like” metaphysics (Aristotelian) and 
absolute connectedness or absolute discreteness. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“There is one reality, at least, which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is 
our own personality in its flowing through time - our self which endures” (Bergson, 1912, 9). 
 
Identity is one of the most interminable sources of philosophical perplexity and dispute. The term identity is 
frequently interchangeably employed to address individuality, or even personhood (with regard to rational/human 
entities). To identify what is the same from what is different is to pronounce identity. For the word identity came 
from the Latin word idem which means “sameness”. To say that things are identical is to say that they are the same. 
“Identity” and “sameness” mean the same; their meanings are identical. In logic, the law of identity states that an 
object is the same as itself: A = A[1].1 Therefore, it is, apparently, a simple self-evident truth. But Paul Ricouer in 
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his book Oneself as Another[2], he discriminates another etymological derivative of the term “identity” with the 
Latin word ipse, understood as “self”. The pronouncement of identity then, is the assertion of the recognition of 
‘oneself’. The equivocity of the term ‘identity’, idem as sameness and ipse as self, leads us to take both 
understanding as modalities in the treatment of identity.  Identity as sameness supports the logical context of 
comparison whether numerical or qualitative; while identity as selfhood contributes to the peculiarity of its being 
delineating its identity as opposed to others.  
 
In the introduction of the book edited by Raymond Martin and John Barresi,and as evident in the trend on the issue 
of personal identity, the pronouncement of identity is what matters in survival [3]. So, what does it mean for the 
individual personal identity to persist? This has been a hackneyed dispute of a many metaphysicians and schools of 
thought that have argued the persistence of entities and change, namely, the endurantists, perdurantists, worm 
theorists, stage-theorists, b-theorists, four-dimensionalists, and exdurantists [4]. There also exists a variety of 
approaches to account the identity through time, e.g., psychological (such as memory criterion), somatic and 
anticriterialism [5].  Hartshorne’s personal identity will help untie the perplexing transtemporal identity knot. Albeit, 
this is not an attempt to render a general resolution to the bewildering disagreements and defenses of every theory of 
time and identity, the author will try to expose and juxtapose, succinctly, only the dominant trends in relation to the 
existent stand of Hartshorne’s personal identity, i.e., endurance and perdurance theories [6].  
 
2. Persistence: Endurantism, Perdurantism, or Partial Identity? 
 
What, then, does it mean for the entity to persist? ItwasDavid Lewis who initially discriminates the theories: 
Let us say that something persist if, somehow or other, it exists at various times; this is the neutral word. 
Something perdures if t persists by having different temporal parts, or stages, at different times, though 
no part of it is wholly present at more than one time; whereas it endures if it persists by being wholly 
present at more than one time [7]. 
 
Endurantism believe persisting entities are three-dimensional, wholly present at each time at which they exist, and 
lacking temporal parts. In this theory, the person is wholly present at each moment of time. They believe ordinary 
objects do not have temporal parts. Objects endure in the context that they are wholly present at every time at which 
they exist. The entity instantiate itself at different times but holds the same entire reality each time. Just as one’s 
body has parts, as time moves a long, then, as a whole person move along with all his/her body parts. One moment 
you are standing in a corner and then the next moment you’ve moved away from the corner. Still the person holds 
the entirety of his body.  
 
Perdurance, on the other hand, hold that persisting objects are four-dimensional, spread out in time, and composed 
of temporal parts. An object is a spatially extended three-dimensional thing that also extends across the fourth 
dimension of time. This four-dimensional object is made up of three-dimensional time-slices. These are spatially 
extended things that exist only at individual points in time. An object is made up of a series of causally related time-
slices. All time-slices are identical to themselves. And the whole aggregate of time-slices, namely the four-
dimensional object, is also numerically identical with itself. But the individual time-slices can have qualities that 
differ from each other [8]. It may correspond to the way a play is extended in time: Act II is not present when Act I 
is. But the entirety of acts extended through time corresponds to the whole play. Partition is a common construct that 
is usually employed in space. An entity is usually thought to be made up of spatial parts. But perdurantists think of 
entities as made up of, not just spatial parts but temporal parts that perdure. An entity is usually thought to be made 
up of spatial parts. But perdurantists think of entities as made up of, not just spatial parts but temporal parts that 
perdure [7]. 
 
Allegedly, an object which either endures or perdures can be said to persist. But the confounding part is the 
justification of temporal passage or ‘becoming’ whether an endurant or perdurant perspective. Identity over time is a 
controversial notion, because time involves change. Notice that the endurance theory adheres to a sort of 
“substance” metaphysics as its locus of persistence that is wholly present in every time-slice. It maintains a visage of 
Aristotle’s “accidental properties” to account the temporal passage. The change that is incurred by the entity through 
time is superficial or a change in the external properties. However, it has been evident to us that there exists a 
change which is also essential to the entirety of the object, i.e, a change in internal properties. This conceptuality, 
hence, has been rendered problematic by the foregoing. Aside from the fact that this kind of persistence exemplifies 
numerical identity which is symmetrical, corollary to this is the unaccountability of temporary intrinsic [7].  While 
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the way of describing the position of the perdurance theory, then, is to say that it denies the existence of a distinct 
ontological category of persisting things, i.e., substances. Although, perdurance assents to the recognition of 
temporal parts as its justification of temporary intrinsics, the summation of these parts or stages appertains to the 
entity itself. Following the inference of perdurance, the entirety of stages or moments of a person’s life sums up the 
identity of the person, hence, to isolate a time-slice is to capture a temporal part, that is, no more than a mere part. 
Each time-slice is a segment and not the absolute self. Albeit, perdurance argues that the episodic experience is no 
less an experience of self, still, it lacks the conscious self-unifying consciousness.  
 
Personal (partial) identity, on the other hand and as a synthetic resolution to the endurantists and perdurantists’ 
sides, proposes a new paradigm without compromising the concepts of temporary intrinsic, change, self-unifying 
element and persistence. What is called for is an identity that accedes to the inevitableness of temporal accumulation 
and at the same time not at the expense of persistence of a unifying continuity of character. Hence, partial identity 
qualifies under these criterions. For personal (partial) identity is the persistence of certain defining characteristics in 
a very complex reality which constantly changes [6]. Personal identity is literally partial identity and therefore 
partial non-identity, the non-identity referring to the changes incurred through temporal passage while the 
asymmetrical cumulative prehension of the previous linear order or society grants its genetic identity. Holding 
partial identity also resolves the temporary intrinsics’ problem, for the fulcrum of the problem lies on treating an 
object with a persisting entity. For the presupposition and bias is that the ‘enduring substance’ can never sustain 
change in its intrinsic property and at the same time maintaining its identity through time. This is the product of the 
perception of the absoluteness of identity, and a univocity of the term identity. Identity is not sheer sameness of 
entity through time. The uniqueness of the unity of character through time prehended by a single individual or entity 
pronounces this kind of identity.  
 
 
3. Inheritance and Defense of Event Pluralism 
 
The startling feature of Hartshorne’s process philosophy is its conception of individual personal identity which 
abandons entirely the “substance” metaphysics of the self as held by Plato, Augustine, Kant and other classical 
Western metaphysicians. In the most concrete terms, according to Hartshorne, there is no permanently or 
continuously enduring self-identical soul that persists unchanged from conception to death and perhaps beyond [9]. 
Hartshorne does not say that personal identity through change is unreal or illusory, but he does assert that it is an 
abstraction and not a concrete entity. Absolute identity then is impossible, while partial identity is the only tenable 
option of individual identity. For personal identity, each new experience, if added to the old self, would make that 
self a new totality that is different from the previous self by virtue of the newly added experience. In partial identity, 
I am partly identical to myself in virtue of the prehended past, but at the same time, I am partly non-identical to 
myself due to the novel incurred reality. The synthesis of the old self and that of the novel self constitute partial 
identity. Therefore, each moment of experience of the idem-identity (self) must make it a slightly different and novel 
self. The new self of each moment partly includes the old experiences through memory, provided it is clearly 
understood that the old self is contained within the new experiences and not the converse [10]. 
 
Hartshorne contextualizes ‘inherit’ as the causal inclusion and/or assimilation of the past in to the present. It is the 
recognition of how the present experient occasion prehends the past. He indicates that we take human experiences 
causally to ‘inherit’ directly from some bodily processes, and these to inherit directly from our experiences, 
inheriting in each case implying temporal ‘following’, rather than sheer ‘accompanying’. Thus the general principle 
of causality is all we need. And since individual genetic identity is explicable as a distinctive special case of the way 
in which concrete actualities are caused by, follow, and include others, sharing abstract factors in common, the 
concept of ‘substance’ is shown to be no absolute addition. Causality, substance, memory, perception, temporal 
succession, modality, are all but modulations of one principle of creative synthetic experiencing, feeding entirely 
upon its own prior products [11]. At a given moment, each individual is almost entirely a product, not simply a 
producer. The route of Inheritance garners what is given from its own previous actuality (inherence) and the 
inclusion of the feeling of others to the nascent self (insistence), and these synthesis successively occur moment by 
moment, ever increasing accumulation of the inherited whole, of which each moment generates an entirely new 
individual more than its mere aggregation. Inheritance must not be construed as an ‘uninterrupted’ link from the past 
to the present but a recognition of the prehended series to the new self which no other individual possesses.  It is 
given that what persists from the past into the present is the past itself [11]. Inheritance is the process of causality of 
the past. It is the integration of inherence and insistence of the past actualities to provide a continuous framework of 
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inheritance. Inheritance must not be construed as prehension for it refers to their persistence in the present. 
Prehension involves that recognition of the act of inheritance. The principle of inheritance validates an ongoing 
society in every individual identity. That without which, the event-sequence or experient occasions do not just fall 
isolated, remote from, and devoid of any personal series. Inheritance is akin to a conceptual line that links the 
common ancestry of one’s personal society or linear series. This ongoing society is the property of the individual 
alone, for which this individual holds an exclusive route of inheritance that no other entity possesses.  
 
Adhering to the reasoning of individual identity as a sequence of actualities, there emerges an ethical challenge, i.e., 
responsibility is lost. It follows that there is no-sense of keeping a promise if it was made by another actuality. Or 
even paying of debts by the current actuality owed by a previous one. Again, Hartshorne’s refutation to this 
argument is that they both represent the same ongoing society. Each of the successive selves of an individual 
represents himself/herself as such a society [11]. Each such self-identity (ipseity) inherits from its predecessors 
(previous actualities) and that includes purposes, and the more it can accept and execute these purposes, the richer 
and more harmonious will be its own content. The route of inheritance is the one responsible for this causal order 
and at the same instance generates a certain substantiality of process. Becoming is continuous in a creative synthetic 
fashion. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Identity, then, is the repository of all that has been inherited; and becoming is not a special mode of reality, rather it 
is its overall character. Each act of prehension is a creative synthesis of all actualities available to the individual 
which also attest to the cumulative process of inheritance – the route of inheritance garners what is given from its 
own previous actuality (inherence) and the inclusion of the feeling of others to the nascent self (insistence), and 
these synthesis successively occur moment by moment, ever increasing accumulation of the inherited whole, of 
which each moment generates an entirely new individual more than its mere aggregation. Inheritance must not be 
construed as an ‘uninterrupted’ link from the past to the present but a recognition of the prehended series to the new 
self which no other individual possesses. Hartshorne’s inheritance is a form of ‘unbroken continuance’; although it 
must be emphasized that what is being referred to is not an absolute continuity or strict intrinsic connectedness of 
series, as well as its contrary, absolute discreteness. Hence, identity becomes not an absolute predication akin to 
substance, but an integrated process. This unity of process institutes the unity of self. That every acclamation of the 
self is the affirmation of identity through this special strand of stream of experiences, not as an instantaneous 
concrete reality but of the entire process itself. The many becomes one and are increased by one. This becoming 
itself gives way to its (partial) identity. 
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